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NOTES
FINDING A REMEDY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
USING 42 U.S.C. § 1983 TO FILL IN A
TITLE VI GAP
Certain land uses such as toxic waste landfills and incinerators
can pose serious health hazards. Although no one should have to bear
an inordinate amount of the risk they create, minorities sometimes
suffer a disproportionate amount of the burden. Because of this ineq-
uity, minority communities around the country have pulled together
over the last twenty-five years to counteract the problem under the
banner of environmental justice. Environmental justice is the concept
that all Americans should share equally the burdens of environmental
hazards. As this Note will demonstrate, federal laws prohibit the dis-
crimination which results from making siting decisions that have a
disparate effect on minorities.
There are limits, however, to the number of causes of action a
community that suffers from environmental injustice can bring, and
recently the United States Supreme Court eliminated one action that
many environmental justice advocates perceived as the most promis-
ing. This Note studies the impact of that decision, Alexander v.
Sandoval,' which concerned Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 2 In light
of this decision, the Note considers whether another cause of action,
brought under Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 3 can succeed.
Part I discusses the history of the environmental justice move-
ment and the evidentiary studies that demonstrated the existence of
the problem. Part II focuses on remedies that have proven inadequate
for addressing environmental justice grievances, including the
Sandoval decision, because they require a finding of intentional dis-
crimination. Part III analyzes the viability of the latest potential dis-
parate impact cause of action, a section 1983 claim to enforce regula-
tions promulgated under Title VI. Finally, Part IV discusses altema-
532 U.S. 275 (2001).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
3 Id., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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tive environmental justice remedies that might have to be pursued
more vigorously should the Supreme Court reject a section 1983 ar-
gument.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT
Environmental justice has received attention because poor and
minority communities across the nation have united to form commu-
nity-based grass-roots organizations to combat the unequal enforce-
ment of environmental policies and the inequitable distribution of
environmental hazards in their communities. In 1982, protesters in
predominantly African-American Warren County, North Carolina,
focused national attention on the relationship between pollution and
minority communities for the first time.4 They opposed a decision by
the state to site a landfill for the disposal of soil contaminated by
highly toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in a community that
was 84% African-American. The entire population in Warren County
was 64% African-American, the highest percentage in the state. 5 Al-
though the campaign eventually failed, 400 people were arrested,
which marked the first time anyone in the United States had been
jailed for attempting to prevent a toxic waste landfill. More impor-
tantly, the protests prompted Walter E. Fauntroy, the District of Co-
lumbia's delegate to Congress and an active participant in the cam-
paign, to request that the United States General Accounting Office
(GAO) study the racial demographics of hazardous waste sites.6
The 1983 GAO study examined the relationship between race
and the siting of hazardous waste facilities in the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's Region IV. 7 Region IV consists of Alabama, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Mississippi, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Tennessee. The report found that African-Americans made up
the majority of the population in three of the four communities where
hazardous waste landfills were located. 8  Although African-
Americans comprised only 12% of the nation's population at the time,
42% to 92% of the populations of these three communities were Afri-
can-American. Even the fourth landfill, which was located in a
county with an overall population that was 38% African-American,
4 See Olga L. Moya, Adopting an Environmental Justice Ethic, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 215, 227 (1996) (describing protests in Warren County); see also ROBERT D. BULLARD,
DUMPING IN DIxiE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 31 (3d ed. 2000) (describing
organization by protesters in Warren County).
5 BULLARD, supra note 4, at 30.
6 Id. at 32.
7 id.
8 Id. at 33.
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was located four miles from a populace that was between 69% and
92% African-American in composition.9
The GAO study's narrow geographic scope prompted the United
Church of Christ to create a Commission for Racial Justice (CRJ),
which conducted its own investigation of the correlation between the
distribution of hazardous waste and race.' ° This was the first study
that documented the existence of commercial and uncontrolled haz-
ardous waste sites in minority communities throughout the entire
United States. The CRJ study found that the percentage of minorities
residing in communities with a hazardous waste facility was twice
that of those without a facility." Communities that had more than
one facility or that had one of the five largest commercial waste land-
fills had minority populations more than three times the minority
population of others.' 2 The most significant conclusion the CRJ drew
from its study was that racial composition was the variable best able
to predict the location of a commercial hazardous waste facility.'
3
Despite the CRJ study, public debate about environmental justice
issues did not flourish until the early 1990's.14 The Michigan Confer-
ence on Race and Incidence of Environmental Hazards in January
1990 was a significant moment in the history of the environmental
justice movement. Scholars, social scientists, civil rights activists,
and biological investigators all convened to discuss the inequitable
distribution of environmental hazards in poor and minority communi-
ties, and representatives formally conveyed their concerns to the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA).
15
The EPA created the Environmental Equity Workgroup (EEW)
in response to these concerns. The EEW evaluated the risks associ-
ated with the inequitable distribution of hazardous waste in minority
communities and audited the EPA's own policies from an environ-
mental equity perspective.' 6 Because of the limited data on the corre-
lation between health effects and exposure to environmental hazards,
9 See id. at 33, tbl.2.1 (noting that percentages in each county were 90%, 38%, 52%, and
66% respectively).
10 See COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic WASTES AND
RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 3 (1987).
"Id. at 13 (finding a mean minority population of 24% in communities with an operating
commercial hazardous waste facility versus 12% for communities without a facility).
12 Id. (finding that percentages were 38% minority in areas surrounding the five largest
commercial waste landfills, versus 12% minority in areas without such facilities).
13 See id. (finding that minority population was a stronger predictor than household in-
come, value of home, number of controlled toxic waste sites, or the estimated amount of haz-
ardous waste generated by industry).
14 Moya, supra note 4, at 229.
" Id. at 229-30.
16 OFFICE OF POL'Y, PLANNING, AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, PUB. No. 230-R-92-008,
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, 1- 2 (1992).
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the EEW did not find a conclusive link between the two when it sub-
mitted its report in May 1992. However, it affirmed the noticeable
difference in potential for exposure to environmental pollution be-
cause of race and socioeconomic status. 17
Also in 1992,' the National Law Journal released a report on
EPA Superfund 18 actions that illustrated systematic differences be-
tween actions taken in white and minority communities. 19 Based on
an eight-month analysis, the National Law Journal found that fines
and penalties under environmental laws were higher in white areas
than in minority areas. The report also revealed a disparity in the rate
at which Superfund sites were cleaned up.2° Minority communities
sometimes had to wait four years longer than white communities for
remediation of hazardous waste sites, and this imbalance often oc-
cuffed whether the minority community was wealthy or poor.21
These studies demonstrate the disparate impact from environmental
hazards that racial minorities often face.2
In 1994, President Clinton became involved in the environmental
justice movement with Executive Order 12,898, entitled Federal Ac-
tions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
23Low-Income Populations. The Order instructed federal agencies to
make achieving environmental justice part of their mission. It re-
quired that each agency conduct all of its programs, policies, and ac-
tivities substantially affecting health or the environment in a manner
that ensures that minorities are not denied participation based on race,
color, or national origin.24 The Order also directed the EPA to estab-
lish an Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice. Re-
sponding to Executive Order, the EPA also published Interim Guid-
ance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challeng-
17 See id. at 15 (finding that racial minorities may have a greater potential for exposure
due to socioeconomic factors).18 Congress created the Superfund Program in 1980 to locate, investigate, and clean up
abandoned hazardous waste sites. The EPA administers the program in cooperation with indi-
vidual states.
'9 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Envi-
ronmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1.
20 See id. at S6 (showing that minority sites took 20% longer to be placed on Superfund
list than non-minority sites).
21 Id. (showing greatest disparity in Region 5 where the pace to cleanup minority sites was
13.8 years, compared to 9.7 years for white sites).
22 Although there is substantial support that environmental hazards affect minorities dis-
proportionately, these studies have been criticized, and other studies have been done that have
questioned the environmental justice hypothesis. See THOMAS LAMBERT ET AL., NAT'L LEGAL
CTR. FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, A CRITIQUE OF "ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE" 5 (White Paper vol.
8, no. 1 1996) (criticizing previous definitions of community, problems associated with popula-
tion density, and using zip codes as a unit of research data); see also CHRISTOPHER H. FORE-
MAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, 24-27 (1998) (summarizing
studies criticizing the environmental justice hypothesis).23 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
24 id.
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ing Permits,25 because it expected an increased number of Title VI
complaints.26
II. INADEQUATE REMEDIES
In response to the evidence of environmental injustice, civil
rights and environmental organizations have pursued various judicial
remedies to reduce the adverse and disproportionate impact experi-
enced by minority communities. However, most avenues have failed
to produce a consistently satisfactory result. This section discusses
two tactics that have played a large role in environmental justice liti-
gation, but have proven unsuccessful.
A. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. 27 This guarantee applies to both state and local governments
and imposes a general restraint on the governmental use of classifica-
tions, such as race or gender.28 When a racial classification is used,
the courts apply a strict scrutiny standard of review and will uphold
the classification only if it is the least dramatic way to promote a
compelling governmental interest. 29 However, strict scrutiny will be
applied only where the government's action is intentional. 30 Absent
intent, differential impact is only subject to the test of rationality. In
1976, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis31 explicitly required
that the plaintiffs prove an intent to discriminate in order to establish
an equal protection violation. The plaintiffs in Washington had failed
a written test that measured whether they had the verbal ability and
reading comprehension necessary to become police officers.32 Afri.
can-American applicants had a failure rate four times that of white
applicants, but the Court held this insufficient to prove discriminatory
25 U.S. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATION OF TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS 3 (1998).
26 Jimmy White, Environmental Justice: Is Disparate Impact Enough?, 50 MERCER L.
REV. 1155, 1161 (1999).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 173 (1970) (holding that a local law, or
custom with the force of law, may offend the Fourteenth Amendment without having state-wide
application).
29 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (requiring restrictions based
on race to be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (finding racial distinctions inherently suspect and requiring the
most exacting judicial examination).
30 Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1996).
" 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
32 Id. at 233-34.
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intent. The Court held that a disproportionate impact must be traced
33to an intent to discriminate on the basis of race.
The next year in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.,34 the Supreme Court listed four ele-
ments to consider in determining whether circumstantial evidence
such as a disproportionate impact was sufficient to prove discrimina-
tory intent. A court should consider the historical background of the
decision, the specific series of events preceding the action, whether
there were any substantive or procedural departures from the ordinary
decision-making process, and whether there were relevant statements
in the legislative or administrative history by members of the deci-
sion-making body.35
In a rare case, disparate impact may be sufficient to prove dis-
criminatory intent. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,36 the Supreme Court re-
versed a conviction under a municipal ordinance that was impartial on
its face because the ordinance was enforced in a discriminatory fash-
ion. The regulation in Yick Wo required that all laundries housed in
wooden buildings be licensed before operating. All applicants who
were Chinese were denied, while all but one of the white applicants
were approved.37 Similarly, in Gomillion v. Ligh foot,38 the Supreme
Court held that an Alabama statute that changed city boundaries to
remove all but four or five of 400 African-American voters while not
removing a single white voter was clearly designed to exclude Afri-
can-Americans and was discriminatory. Thus, sometimes a clear pat-
tern, unexplainable on other grounds, emerges from the effect of the
state action even when the government legislation appears neutral on
its face. Such cases are rare, however, and absent a pattern as stark as
that in Yick Wo or Gomillion, impact alone is not determinative of
intent.:
Four cases demonstrate the way courts have interpreted the equal
protection doctrine in cases involving the citing of hazardous waste
facilities in predominantly minority communities. In Bean v. South-
western Waste Management Corp.,40 the plaintiffs sued to enjoin
Texas from siting a solid waste disposal facility within 1700 feet of a
predominantly African-American high school. They attempted to
show a pattern of racial discrimination in the state agency's place-
ment of solid waste sites into minority communities and used statisti-
" id. at 239-42.
14 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
" Id. at 266-68.
36 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
37 Id. at 359.
38 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
-9 Village ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
40 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
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cal data as circumstantial evidence. The court held that they had es-
tablished a substantial threat of irreparable injury. However, it re-
jected the plaintiffs' claim because they lacked a substantial likeli-
hood of success on the merits. It held that, although the siting deci-
sion appeared insensitive and illogical, the plaintiffs had not met their
burden to prove a discriminatory purpose.41 The evidence adduced
did not meet the magnitude required under Arlington Heights.
In East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County
Planning and Zoning Commission,42 the plaintiffs sought to reverse a
local planning board decision to locate a landfill in a predominantly
African-American community. The plaintiffs argued that the court
should consider the county's history of locating undesirable land uses
in predominantly African-American neighborhoods, but the court
held that only the former decisions of that particular planning board
were relevant. Because there was no prior evidence of discrimination
by the board, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of
intentional discrimination based on a disparate impact theory.43 Fatal
to the plaintiffs claim was the fact that the only other similar landfill
was located in a census tract that was predominantly white. The court
also found that the consistent opposition of the landfill siting by local
residents was adequate participation to ensure that a nondiscrimina-
tory process had been followed. 44
Similar to East Bibb, in R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay,45 a biracial citizens
group in Virginia challenged a county board decision to site a landfill
in a predominantly African-American community. Although three
other landfills were sited in neighborhoods that were over ninety-five
percent African-American and the county had previously refused to
site a landfill in a predominantly white neighborhood, the court de-
nied relief because the plaintiff had not met the other parts of the dis-
criminatory purpose equation under Arlington Heights.46 Careful ex-
amination of the administrative steps taken by the board revealed
nothing unusual about the procedure used, and the board had re-
sponded to the concerns and suggestions of citizens by establishing a
citizens' advisory group, among other things. The court held that the
board's approval of the proposed landfill was based not on the racial
composition of the neighborhoods in which the landfill is located but
on the environmental suitability of the site.47 In concluding it stated:
"[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not impose an affirmative duty
41 Id. at 677.
42 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
41 See id. at 886.
" See id. at 885-86 (finding that the county had met its procedural requirements).
45 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
46 See id. at 1148-49.
47 Id. at 1150.
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to equalize the impact of official decisions on different racial
9948groups. Finally, in NAACP v. Gorsuch, the court denied a request
for a preliminary injunction when a PCB disposal facility was sited in
a North Carolina county that had the highest percentage of minority
residents in the state. 49 The court held that there was "not one shred
of evidence that race ha[d] ... been a motivating factor., 50
B. Title VI
Frustrated by the discriminatory intent standard under the Equal
Protection Clause, environmental justice advocates turned to Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to seek relief. Section 601 provides
that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 5' Section 602 au-
thorizes and directs federal agencies to issue rules and regulations to
implement this prohibition.52 Agencies may terminate funding or take
any other action authorized by law if a recipient of federal funds dis-
criminates.
53
Pursuant to section 602 and soon after its passage, several fed-
eral agencies promulgated regulations that applied a disparate impact
test.54 In 1984, the EPA's Office of Civil Rights promulgated a simi-
lar regulation that prohibits any recipient of federal funds from using:
Criteria or methods of administering its program which have
the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because
of their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect
of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program with respect to individuals of a par-
ticular race, color, national origin, or sex.55
The EPA's adoption of a disparate impact standard was important
because the Supreme Court held in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
Commission56 that a plaintiff who brought a claim under section 601
48 id.
49 Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U.L. REV. 787, 832 (1993) (citing NAACP v. Gorsuch, No.
82-768-C[V-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982)).
50 id.
5' 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
52 Id at § 2000d-1.
53 id.
54 See Kenneth Owen, Environmental Justice Enforcement Requires Reassessment Under
the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and Environmental Statutes, 30
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 379, 410 (2000) (stating that seven federal agencies quickly promul-
gated disparate impact regulations after Title VI was passed).
55 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2001).
56 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
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had to prove intentional discrimination just as it would under the
Equal Protection Clause. However, environmental justice groups had
little success filing Title VI complaints with the EPA because the
EPA has to find that the permitted activity has produced an adverse
effect. Thus, environmental justice advocates began suggesting that
suits be brought directly under section 602 against a recipient based
on the EPA's regulation that prohibits a disparate impact.57 Previous
Supreme Court rulings suggested that there might be an implied right
of action under section 602, and some federal circuit courts had held
that such a cause of action was available.58
Despite hopes that a private right of action exists under section
602, in April 2001 the Supreme Court definitively ended any such
possibility in Alexander v. Sandoval.59 Sandoval involved a decision
by the Alabama Department of Public Safety (DPS) to administer
state driver's license examinations solely in English because the Ala-
bama Constitution had been amended to declare English as the state's
official language. The DPS had received grants from the Department
of Justice and the Department of Transportation and was thus subject
to Title VI regulations. 60 Pursuant to section 602, the Justice Depart-
ment had promulgated a regulation like the EPA's that forbade fund-
ing recipients from utilizing "criteria or methods of administration
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination be-
cause of their race, color, or national origin. ' 61 A non-English speak-
ing driver's license applicant brought a class action suit against the
Director of the Alabama DPS arguing that the English-only policy
had a discriminatory effect based on her national origin.62 The Court
did not inquire whether the English-only policy actually had a dis-
criminatory effect, but considered only whether a private right of ac-
tion existed to enforce the regulations.
The Supreme Court made three assumptions. First, private indi-
viduals may sue under section 601 for both injunctive relief and dam-
ages. This was based on the Court's holding in Cannon v. University
of Chicago63 that a private right of action exists under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, which had been modeled on Title
7 See Owen, supra note 54, at 413.
s See, e.g., Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486-87 (10th Cir. 1996) (permitting plain-
tiff to bring disparate impact cause of action, but holding that there was no demonstrated ad-
verse impact in the case); David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
plaintiff may maintain a private cause of action to enforce regulations promulgated under Title
VI and that evidence of discriminatory effect is sufficient to prevail).
'9 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
60 See id. at 278.
61 id.
62 See id. at 279 (arguing that policy had discriminatory effect against Spanish-speaking
citizens).
63 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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VI. 64 Second, section 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination,
which was an essential part of its holding in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke65 and reflected a statement in Alexander v.
Choate66 that "Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of in-
tentional discrimination." Finally, the Court presumed that regula-
tions promulgated by an agency pursuant to section 602 might validly
proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on a racial group,
even though such activities are permissible under section 601.67
Despite the DOJ regulation, the Court held that there is no pri-
vate right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promul-
gated under Title VI. 68 Justice Scalia's majority opinion focused on
the second part of the test set out in Cort v. Ash69 for finding an im-
plied right of action. Under that test, the statute must first create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff. Second, there must be an indica-
tion of legislative intent, explicitly or implicitly, to create a private
remedy. Third, the implied right of action must be consistent with the
underlying purpose of the legislative scheme. Finally, the regulated
area must not be one traditionally regulated by state law, such that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on fed-
eral law.70 Justice Scalia stated: "[T]he judicial task is to interpret the
statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent
to create not just a private right but also a private remedy., 71 Legisla-
tive intent on whether there is a private remedy is determinative be-
cause, without it, a cause of action does not exist.72 The Court then
looked to the text and structure of Title VI to determine whether Con-
gress intended a private right of action. First, it noted that, unlike sec-
tion 601's rights-creating language, section 602 refers only to federal
agencies and does not mention private individuals at all. Because
section 602 is phrased as a directive to federal agencies, it reveals no
congressional intent to create a private right of action.73 "[I]t is most
certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up
a private cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress. 74
64 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280.
65 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
66 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985).67 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281-82 (citing the opinions of five justices in Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)).
68 Id. at 285.
69 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
70 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979) (applying the four Cort
factors).
7' Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.
72 id.
73 See id. at 289.
74 Id. at 29 1.
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The Court found no intent to create a private remedy in the
methods provided to enforce regulations in section 602, either. Sec-
tion 602 empowers agencies to enforce their regulations either by
terminating funding to the particular program or "by any other means
authorized by law.",75 If an agency wants to cut funding, however,
various procedures and restrictions apply. 6 The Court reasoned that
this did not lead to the conclusion that a private party should have
easy access to enforce rights given by agency regulations. In fact, the
elaborate restrictions on terminating funding tended to contradict a
congressional intent to create a privately enforceable right." In short,
there was no evidence anywhere in the text to suggest that Congress
intended to create a private right of action under section 602.
Last, the Court rejected an argument that amendments to Title VI
in the Rehabilitation Act of 1986 and the Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1987 had ratified the finding of an implied right of action to en-
force disparate impact regulations. 78 However, as the Court noted,
these amendments covered only section 601 and did not alter the ex-
isting causes of action and corresponding remedies permissible under
Title VI. Therefore, the Court held that neither as enacted nor
amended does Title VI display Congress' intent to create a freestand-
ing private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under
section 602, and thus no such right of action exists.
III. THE DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Although Sandoval involved a disparate impact claim brought
under regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice, the Su-
preme Court's broad language reaches regulations promulgated by
any federal agency pursuant to section 602. Thus, it eliminated the
ability of a private litigant to enforce the EPA's Office of Civil Rights
regulations directly under section 602. However, a private litigant
may file a claim with the EPA itself if a violation occurs, and in the
wake of Sandoval, environmental justice advocates have quickly
adopted a new approach for privately enforcing EPA regulations by
suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000).
76 See id. §2000d-2.
77 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290.
71 Id. at 291-93.
79 Id. at 293.
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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be li-
able to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.80
Thus, if a litigant can prove all of the elements of a section 1983
claim, it is still possible to privately enforce regulations promulgated
by an agency under section 602. The Supreme Court in Sandoval did
not address whether a section 1983 claim can be brought to enforce
agency regulations, but limited its holding to whether section 602
provided its own private right of action.81 In his dissent, though, Jus-
tice Stevens suggested that "[1]itigants who in the future wish to en-
force the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood
must only reference section 1983 to obtain relief., 82 Justice Stevens
also noted that the litigants in Sandoval retained the option of chal-
lenging Alabama's English-only policy in a complaint that invokes
section 1983.83
A. The Validity of Section 602 Disparate Impact Regulations
The initial question, never directly addressed by the Supreme
Court, is whether regulations promulgated by the EPA under section
602 that prohibit disparate impact discrimination are a valid exercise
of an agency's authority when section 601 prohibits only intentional
discrimination. Although the Supreme Court has never directly ad-
dressed what forms of discrimination section 601 prohibits, essential
to its holding in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke84
was the understanding that section 601 reaches only the same types of
discrimination as the Equal Protection Clause. In Bakke, the Court
held that a state medical school admissions program that reserved a
certain number of positions in each class for disadvantaged minorities
would be illegal under section 601.85 As discussed above, the Su-
preme Court held in Washington v. Davis86 that a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause requires a finding of intentional discrimina-
tion; therefore, it follows necessarily that section 601 prohibits only
intentional discrimination as well. Thus, regulations that prohibit dis-
parate impact discrimination go beyond what is prohibited by section
601 directly.
No Supreme Court decision has squarely addressed whether dis-
parate impact regulations are valid. In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Ser-
'0 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
81 Sandoval, 532 U.S at 279.
82 Id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83 Id.
'4 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
" Id. at 320.
86 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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vice Commission,87 the Court held that minority members of New
York City's police department who challenged the city's "last-hired,
first-fired" policy were not entitled to compensatory relief under Title
VI. In addition to addressing the central issue, three justices stated
that, although section 601 reaches only intentional discrimination,
agency regulations under section 602 which forbid disparate impact
discrimination are valid exercises of agency discretion and are author-
ized by the statute.88 Another two justices would have held that sec-
tion 601 reached disparate impact and not just intentional discrimina-
tion. 89 It follows that they would have also upheld authoritative regu-
lations promulgated under section 602 that prohibit disparate impact
discrimination. Thus, five justices were of the opinion that agency
regulations prohibiting disparate impact were valid. However, in a
fragmented decision like Guardians, 'the holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds."' 90 In Guardians, the nar-
rowest ground for the holding was in the opinion of Justice White,
who delivered the opinion of the Court, yet was one of the justices
who would have upheld the validity of the regulation. Because he
based his decision on the fact that the police officers sought monetary
damages and not just injunctive relief, his opinion that the regulation
was valid was not essential to the holding.9 Thus, despite the opin-
ions of five justices, Guardians did not hold that disparate impact
regulations are valid. In subsequent decisions, the Court has avoided
addressing this issue directly, but based on the opinions of the five
justices in Guardians, has always assumed that such regulations are
valid.92 However, it is still an open question whether regulations
promulgated under section 602 are valid if they go beyond prohibiting
just intentional discrimination.
Pursuant to section 602, federal agencies are directed to "effec-
tuate" the provisions of section 601. The agency must stay within the
bounds of the power delegated to it by Congress. As the Supreme
Court stated in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder:93 "The rulemaking
power granted to an administrative agency charged with the admini-
stration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is
'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Con-
"' 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
88 Id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 See id. at 593; see also id. at 624 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9o Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
9' See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607.
92 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282 (2001); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 293 (1985).
"' 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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gress as expressed by the statute.' 94 In Ernst & Ernst,95 the Court
held invalid a change in the Securities and Exchange Commission's
interpretation of Rule 1Ob-5,96 which imposed liability for negligence
under a statute that spoke in terms of manipulation and deception.97
The Court held that, when a statute speaks so specifically in terms of
manipulation and deception, and when its history does not reflect a
more expansive intent, its scope cannot extend to negligence.98 In
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 99 the Court reiterated this rule that agency regulations may not
be broader than the statutes under which they are promulgated. The
Court cited its language from Ernst & Ernst, and held that a private
plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under Rule lOb-
5 because the statute authorizing the rule, section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 19341°° does not prohibit a class of behavior
broad enough to encompass those acts.' 0 '
Confronted with a different section of the Securities Exchange
Act in United States v. O'Hagan,10 2 however, the Supreme Court took
a different approach. Unlike the regulation promulgated under sec-
tion10(b) at issue in Ernst & Ernst and Central Bank of Denver,
which permitted the SEC to prescribe only manipulative or deceptive
devices, in O'Hagan, the case involved a regulation promulgated un-
der section 14(e). 10 3 Section 14(e) grants the SEC authority to pro-
scribe means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive,
and manipulative practices.' °4 The SEC's Rule 14e-3(a) forbids trad-
ing on material nonpublic information if the trader knows or has rea-
son to know the information has been acquired directly or indirectly
from an inside source even if the trader owes no fiduciary duty to the
company. 0 5 The Court found that the rule was reasonably designed
to carry out section 14(e). More importantly, it reasoned that because
a prophylactic measure's mission is to prevent, it typically encom-
passes more than the core activity prohibited. 0 6  The Court added
that section 14(e)'s rulemaking authority gives the SEC latitude to
regulate nondeceptive activities even in the context of a term of art
94 Id. at 213-14 (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)).
9' Id. at 185.
96 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
9' Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214.
98 Id.99 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
"0o 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
'0' Central Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177.
'02 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
I0 ld. at 667.
'o 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000).
'0' 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2001).
06 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673.
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like "manipulative." In conclusion, it held under section 14(e) that
the SEC may prohibit acts not themselves fraudulent as long as the
prohibition is reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent acts."0 7
Section 602 directs agencies to effectuate the provisions of sec-
tion 601 by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicabil-
ity. 0 8 As in O'Hagan, Title VI is a prophylactic measure, the goal of
which is preventing discrimination. Section 602 directs agencies to
take measures that will ensure that its goal' of protecting all people
from discrimination will be realized, but it does not provide a precise
definition of what constitutes discrimination. Unlike the statute in
Ernst & Ernst, section 601 does not speak in specific terms; instead, it
leaves agencies broad discretion to determine what rules will best ac-
complish its goal. The test of whether the means employed by an
agency is permissible, even though it may encompass more than the
core activity prohibited, comes from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.1°9 As in O'Hagan, agency promul-
gations should be given deference unless Congress unambiguously
addressed the precise question and it is inconsistent with the agency's
construction, or if the agency's choice was arbitrary or capricious. 1
0
Although courts have held that section 601 prohibits only intentional
discrimination,1 ' the statute itself does not make this clear. Accord-
ingly, regulations promulgated under section 602 that prohibit dispa-
rate impact discrimination are valid because they are reasonably de-
signed to effectuate the prevention of discrimination.
B. The Viability of a Section 1983 Action
Bringing an action under section1983 avoids the requirement
that Congress intended a remedy under section 602 because section
1983 provides the remedy for a violation of any right secured by "the
Constitution or laws." The Supreme Court has provided guidance on
what test governs an action brought under section 1983. First, the
plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right. 1 2 Second, even
when the plaintiff has asserted a federal right, the defendant may
show that Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy under section
107 Id.
'0' 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (2000).
'0' 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Io See id. at 844.
111 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 458
U.S. 265 (1978).
112 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (ex-
plaining that § 1983 speaks in terms of rights, privileges, or immunities, not violations of federal
law).
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1983 by providing a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for pro-
tection of a federal right." 
3
A plaintiff must not merely assert the violation of a federal law,
but must assert the violation of a federal right to meet the first re-
quirement. 114 To determine whether a federal statute creates a federal
right, the Court uses a three-part test most recently articulated in
Blessing v. Freestone. 15 First, Congress must have intended that the
provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the right is not so "vague and amorphous" that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute
must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the states; thus,
the provision giving rise to the right must be couched in mandatory
rather than precatory terms.11
6
This test differs from the four-factor test enunciated in Cort v.
Ash" 17 that establishes whether a statute creates an implied right of
action. Unlike that test, the Blessing test does not require the finding
of a remedy under the statute because section 1983 provides the rem-
edy itself. 1 8 This remedy is presumed because Congress is presumed
to legislate against the background of section 1983. Therefore, courts
need only find the violation of a federal right, as in the first part of the
Cort test."9
Before reaching the Blessing test, a court must analyze the EPA
regulations to determine whether they qualify as "laws" under section
1983. Section 7.30 of the EPA's implementing regulations provides:
"No person shall be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving EPA assistance on the basis of race, color, national
origin, [or sex]."' 2 ° Section 7.35 lists specific prohibitions. In addi-
tion to other specific prohibitions, Part A provides that no recipient
shall directly or through other arrangements on the basis of race,
color, national origin, or sex: deny a person any service or benefit of
the program, provide a person any service or benefit different than
that provided to others, or restrict any person in the enjoyment of a
privilege enjoyed by others provided by the program.'12  Recipients
must also "take affirmative action to provide remedies to those who
13 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (holding that establishing an indi-
vidual right only creates a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983).
114 See id. at 340.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 340-41.
117 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
... See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,
508 n.9 (1990) (explaining that plaintiff need only establish a federal right).
119 See supra text accompanying note 70.
120 40 C.F.R. § 7.30(1999).
121 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(a)(l)-(6) (2001).
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have been injured by the discrimination."'' 22 Part B prohibits a recipi-
ent from using "criteria or methods of administering its program
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination be-
cause of their race, color, national origin, or sex."'
123
Although any rights created by these provisions do not appear
explicitly in a statute, courts should still apply the Blessing test be-
cause the regulations have the same binding effect as a statute. The
Supreme Court has held that federal regulations can have the force of
law. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,124 the Court held that regulations
have the force of law if they are substantive, meaning they function as
legislative-type rules that affect individual rights and obligations, if
Congress granted the agency the authority to promulgate such regula-
tions, and if the regulations were promulgated in accordance with ap-
plicable procedural requirements. The Chrysler test is regularly ap-
plied to determine whether a particular regulation has the force and
effect of law. 25 Furthermore, scholars recognize that a valid legisla-
tive rule has the same binding effect as a statute. 126 A legislative rule
can impose distinct obligations on members of the public in addition
to those imposed by statute, as long as the rule is within the scope of
authority conferred upon the agency by Congress.127 Because they
satisfy the three-part Chrysler test, the EPA regulations should be
considered "laws" under section 1983. They were promulgated by
the EPA pursuant to section 602 and are legislative rules under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 28  Section 7.35 creates obligations
that directly affect individuals.129 Congress did not merely authorize
agencies like the EPA to promulgate such regulations, but actually
directed them to do so. 30 Finally, there is no dispute that the regula-
tions were adopted pursuant to applicable procedural requirements.
As discussed above, the EPA's implementing regulations are a
valid exercise of its authority under section 602. Because they have
the force of law as valid legislative rules, they should qualify as
12' 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(a)(7) (2001).
123 40C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2001).
124 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
'2 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 470 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying the
Chrysler test); United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., 800 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding that substantive regulations may have the force of law if they are authorized by Con-
gress and promulgated by an agency to implement a statute); Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v.
FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 889 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying the Chrysler test).
126 See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6.2 (3d ed. 1994).
127 See id. § 6.3.
12s 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
129 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2001) (providing that a recipient shall not use criteria or methods
of administering its program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination
because of their race, color, national origin, or sex).
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000).
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"laws" under section 1983. Therefore, a court must determine next
whether they create an enforceable right under section 1983. The Su-
preme Court held in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority13 1 that an agency may create rights within the
meaning of section 1983. In that case, the plaintiff brought a section
1983 action charging that the Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing
Authority overbilled him in violation ofthe Brooke Amendment to
the Housing Act of 1937 and the implementing regulations of the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 132 The Court
held that the HUD regulations defining the term "reasonable" created
a right enforceable under section 1983, that HUD's view was entitled
to deference as a valid interpretation of the statute, and that Congress
in the course of amending the provision had not disagreed with this
interpretation.' 33 The intent of the Brooke Amendment to benefit the
plaintiff was undeniable, and the HUD regulations had the force of
law. Furthermore, the rights created were sufficiently specific to
qualify as enforceable under section 1983 and were not beyond the
competence of the judiciary to enforce.' 34 Similarly, because section
602 directs agencies to effectuate section 601, which creates individ-
ual rights, an agency may create such rights as long as it is acting
within the scope of its delegated authority and the rights created sat-
isfy the Blessing test.1
35
Federal circuit courts have disagreed as to what extent a regula-
tion may create an enforceable right. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held in Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn136
that a federal regulation itself may create an enforceable right if it
meets the three-part Blessing test because a regulation has the force of
law. At issue was whether a Federal Communications Commission
regulation prohibiting enforcement of local zoning ordinances that
unduly interfered with individual satellite antennas created a private
right of action under section 1983. The underlying statute authorized
individuals to receive unscrambled satellite programming for private
viewing. Finding that local ordinances regularly interfered with the
right to receive satellite signals for home viewing, the FCC preempted
these with its regulation. The court held that, despite a city ordinance
requiring approval from the zoning board of appeals before installing
an antenna for private viewing, the Loschiavos were intended benefi-
ciaries of the preemption regulation and were entitled to bring a sec-
... 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
132 Id. at 419.
133 Id. at 430.
14 See id. at 431-32 (explaining that the regulations specifically set out guidelines that the
housing authorities were to follow).
... 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
136 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994).
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tion 1983 action to enforce their right to a satellite antenna for home
viewing.1
37
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has held that federal regulations may create enforceable rights
under section 1983 if the regulations satisfy the Chrysler test. In
Samuels v. District of Columbia,138 tenants of federally funded hous-
ing sued local public housing officials for violating the United States
Housing Act and the grievance procedure regulations promulgated by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) pursuant
to it. The court held that the plaintiffs' allegation that the District's
public housing officials had violated the regulations by itself ad-
vanced a cognizable section 1983 claim.1 39 Because HUD's griev-
ance procedures were issued under a congressional directive to im-
plement specific statutory norms and affected individual rights, they
clearly had the full force and effect of law. 140 The court also held that
section 1983's "and laws" clause included at least those federal regu-
lations adopted pursuant to clear congressional mandate that have the
full force and effect of law. 141
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, and
Eleventh Circuits have not read Wright as broadly. In Smith v.
Kirk,142 the Fourth Circuit held that an administrative regulation can-
not create an enforceable section 1983 interest not already implicit in
the statute. It noted that, although the Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed the issue, Justice O'Connor's dissent in Wright expressed
doubt that administrative regulations alone could create such a
right. 43 In Smith, the plaintiff's application for a specially equipped
van was denied because the North Carolina's Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation Services applied an economic needs test. Smith sued
under section 1983 based on mandatory language in a Social Security
Administration regulation that provided that selection should be with-
out regard to the applicant's need for financial assistance. 44 Because
the statute conferred only one benefit on an individual, which should
be promptly referred to the agency administering the decision, and the
regulation was not based on it, the court upheld dismissal of the case.
'M Id. at 553.
' 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
"9 Id. at 199.
140 id.
141 id.
142 821 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1987).
143 Id. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 438
(1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I am concerned, however, that lurking behind the Court's
analysis may be the view that, once it has been found that a statute creates some enforceable
right, any regulation adopted within the purview of the statute creates rights enforceable in
federal court, regardless of whether Congress or the promulgating agency ever contemplated
such result.").
'" Smith, 821 F.2d at 984.
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In Harris V. James,145 the Eleventh Circuit made a similar hold-
ing. In that case, a Medicaid recipient brought a section 1983 claim
alleging that Alabama's Medicaid plan was not in compliance with a
federal regulation that required it to provide transportation for recipi-
ents to and from health care providers. This requirement was not
provided for in the statute, but appeared only in the regulation. In the
court's view, the driving force behind the Supreme Court's case law
is a requirement that the courts find a congressional intent to create a
particular federal right.1 46 A regulation may create an enforceable
right if it further defines or fleshes out the content of an existing right,
but it cannot create a new one. A regulation that goes beyond expli-
cating the specific content of the statutory provision and imposes dis-
tinct obligations to further the broad underlying objectives of the stat-
ute is too far removed from congressional intent to constitute a federal
right enforceable under section 1983.147 In Harris, the court heldthat
the nexus between the transportation regulation and congressional
intent was too tenuous to create an enforceable right. It distinguished
Wright because the statute in that case had already created a right that
the regulation merely defined.
48
Finally, the Third Circuit has recently specifically addressed
whether the EPA regulations under consideration in this Note create
an enforceable section 1983 right. In South Camden Citizens in Ac-
tion v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,49 a
community organization brought an action asserting that the state en-
vironmental agency's decision to issue an air pollution permit for a
cement processing facility would have a racially discriminatory im-
pact. The plaintiff first attempted to bring its action directly under
Title VI, but Sandoval expressly foreclosed this remedy soon after a
preliminary injunction was issued. The district court permitted the
action to remain in court, however, and left the injunction intact under
a section 1983 theory. The district court held that a section 1983 ac-
tion can be brought to enforce disparate impact regulations promul-
gated to enforce Title VI. 50
On appeal the Third Circuit reversed in a split decision that
adopted an approach similar to the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits.' 5' It
141 127 F.3d 993 (11lth Cir. 1997).
146 Id. at 1008 (finding a clear expression of the need that courts must find congressional
intent to create a federal right in Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347 (1992)).
147 See id. at 1009 (explaining that holding otherwise would be inconsistent with the re-
quirement of intent).
148 Id. (noting difference between interpretive and substantive regulations).
149 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd, 274 F.3d 771 (3rd Cir. 2001).
"0 Id. at 549 (holding that plaintiffs met all parts of the Blessing test and that a remedy was
not foreclosed by statute or the regulations).
151 South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir.
2001).
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noted that the prohibition on disparate impact discrimination does not
appear explicitly in Title VI, but rather is set forth in the EPA regula-
tion. It also noted considerable tension between the section 602 regu-
lations proscribing activities that have a disparate impact and section
601 's limitation to prohibition of intentional discrimination only, but
presumed the regulations valid as the Court had in Sandoval.5 2 Next
it concluded that the Supreme Court had never directly addressed
whether a regulation can itself establish an enforceable right under
section 1983. It noticed that, although three justices in Guardians had
stated that regulations that have the force of law could create an en-
forceable section 1983 right, four justices in Wright expressed skepti-
cism that they could in all instances.
153
The court distinguished Wright from the situation before it be-
cause the regulation in Wright merely defined a right that already ap-
peared explicitly in the statute. The regulation in Wright defined
what was meant by "reasonable." However, the right sought to be
enforced in South Camden, to be protected from disparate impact dis-
crimination, does not appear explicitly in sections 601 or 602.114 Be-
cause section 601 has been held to protect against intentional dis-
crimination only, regulations that go beyond this protection may not
rely on Wright as permissible for merely defining the statute. The
majority also distinguished its previous decisions on which the plain-
tiffs had relied by stating either that the right enforced in those cases
stemmed directly from the statute or that the court had not actually
addressed the specific question at hand; thus, those decisions were not
binding. 155
In Powell v. Ridge,156 the Third Circuit had permitted a challenge
under section 1983 to Pennsylvania's public education funding prac-
tices on the ground that they had a racially discriminatory effect.
However, because the court had found a private right of action as
well, it presumed the intent requirement of the Blessing test satisfied
and did not address whether a regulation in itself could create an en-
forceable right under section 1983.157
After examining the split in circuit court opinions, the South
Camden court rejected the Loschiavo approach because the Supreme
Court in Sandoval had stated, "[l]anguage in a regulation may invoke
a private right of action that Congress through statutory text created,
52 d. at 780 n.6.
I5' ld. at 781.
' Id. at 783.
... Id. at 783-85 (analyzing Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 401 (3d Cir. 1999); West Vir-
ginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989); Alexander v. Polk, 750 F.2d 250,
261 (3d Cir. 1984)).
156 189 F.3d 387, 401 (3d Cir. 1999).
157 Id. (considering this issue as a matter of judicial expediency because it would arise on
remand).
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but it may not create ,a right that Congress has not."' 58 It determined
that of paramount importance in Wright and Suter v. Artist M.159 was
that Congress intended to create an enforceable right in the statute.
In Suter, the plaintiffs brought suit under section 1983 and the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. They relied on language
in the Act that seemingly requires states to make reasonable efforts to
place children in foster homes. To analyze the section 1983 claim,
the Supreme Court asked: "Did Congress, in enacting the Adoption
Act, unambiguously confer upon the child beneficiaries of the Act a
right to enforce the requirement that the state make 'reasonable ef-
forts' to prevent a child from being removed from his home. . . .
The Court found that the Act only requires that the states have a plan
that is "in effect." Because the "reasonable efforts" language in the
statute left the states with broad discretion in creating such a plan, the
court found that this language could not form the basis of an enforce-
able section 1983 right.
The court in South Camden interpreted this as an indication that
the primary consideration for a court in analyzing a section 1983
claim should be whether Congress intended to create the particular
right sought to be enforced. Because section 602 is limited to effec-
tuating rights created in section 601 and because section 601 prohibits
only intentional discrimination, it held that there is no congressional
intent under section 602 to permit individuals to enforce regulations
that protect against disparate impact discrimination.162 Furthermore,
as the Supreme Court noted in Sandoval, the focus of section 602 is
twice removed from the individuals who will benefit from it. It fo-
cuses neither on the individuals protected nor the funding recipients,
but on the agencies that will do the regulating.' 63 Therefore, section
602 reveals no congressional intent to create a private right of action.
The court in South Camden interpreted this as establishing that there
was no evidence of congressional intent to create any new rights un-
der section 602.' 64 Even though the four-factor Cort test differs from
the three-factor Blessing test, this analysis relies on the intent re-
quirement common to both. In short, the court held that, although the
EPA regulations are presumably valid, they are too far removed from
158 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001).
"9 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992).
'60 Id. at 357.
161 Id. at 363.
162 South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 788 (3d
Cir. 2001).
163 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 (noting that the rights-creating language in section 601
does not appear in section 602); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
1'4 South Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d at 789.
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congressional intent to constitute a federal right enforceable under
section 1983.165
The court in South Camden misinterpreted Sandoval and Suter,
however. Although these cases looked for a "right of action" and a
"right to enforce," this was really a question of whether Congress in-
tended to provide a remedy.166 Finding intent to create a remedy is an
analysis of the second part of the Cort test, not the first part, which is
the element of the two tests that the South Camden court says overlap.
The first parts of the tests do not overlap because the first part of the
Cort test, that the statute must create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff, does not require intent but the first part of the Blessing test
does. 67 In neither Cort nor Suter did the Supreme Court use the word
"intent" when stating the test for whether a right was created in favor
of the plaintiff, while it does explicitly ask whether Congress intended
to create a remedy for the second part of the Cort test. Similarly, the
Court in Sandoval looked only for intent to allow a private right of
action, or intent to provide a remedy under the second part of the Cort
test. 68 Justice Scalia cautioned in Sandoval that courts are bound by
holdings, not language.
Even if an intent component is read into the first part of the Cort
test, this is a different question than that addressed in Sandoval. The
Court in Sandoval looked for congressional intent to provide a rem-
edy under the second part of the Cort test, not the creation of a right
under the first part. Therefore, that the Court in Sandoval ended its
search for congressional intent to create a private remedy with the text
and structure of Title VI does not limit the scope of review a court
should pursue when determining whether the first part of the Blessing
test has been met. In addition to the text and structure of Title VI, its
legislative history must be considered relevant. The Court considered
legislative history to determine Congress' intent to create enforceable
rights in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 69 Suter v. Artist M., 70
and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman.171
In Wilder, the Court considered whether 42 U.S.C. § 1396 cre-
ates an enforceable section 1983 right for health care providers to en-
sure that Medicaid rates are reasonable and adequate. In holding that
65 Id. at 791.
166 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (stating that the judicial task in determining whether
there is an implied right of action is whether Congress intended to create a remedy); Suter v.
Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992) (focusing on whether the'statute unambiguously conferred a
right to enforce the requirement that the state make reasonable efforts to prevent a child from
being removed from his home).167 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
161 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288.
'69 496 U.S. 498, 515-18 (1990).
170 503 U.S. at 362.
171 451 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).
519
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
it did, the Court noted that any doubt that Congress "intended to re-
quire [the states] to adopt [adequate and reasonable rates] is quickly
dispelled by a review of the legislative history .. ,,2 In Pennhurst,
the Court, in determining the scope and meaning of the Developmen-
tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, stated that
"[iln expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sen-
tence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy.' 73 The Court looked first at
the language of the Act and then at the legislative history, but con-
cluded that the statute did not impose binding obligations on the state
to provide appropriate treatment in the least restrictive environ-
ment. 
174
Similarly, congressional history is relevant to the intent behind
Title VI. In creating Title VI, Congress intended to prohibit discrimi-
nation against individuals on the basis of race, color, or national ori-
gin, and to benefit individuals who were being subjected to discrimi-
nation. Representative John Lindsay succinctly stated the intent of
Title VI: "Everything in this proposed legislation has to do with pro-
viding a body of law which will surround and protect the individual..
• . In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court stated
that in enacting "Title IX, like its model Title VI, . . . Congress...
wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against
[discriminatory] practices.' 176
In enacting Title VI, Congress did not define discrimination in
either section 601 or section 602. Instead, it left agencies to decide
what kinds of provisions would most effectively prevent discrimina-
tion. Attorney General Robert Kennedy testified that specifics were
not written into the legislation because there are so many different
programs that, to write out what rules and regulations should be is-
sued would be virtually impossible. 77 Thus, Congress in section 602
"authorized and directed" this responsibility to federal agencies.178
Because Congress left it to federal agencies to determine what type of
actions should be prohibited in order to protect minorities, regulations
promulgated pursuant to section 602 that have the force of law and
that define and prohibit discrimination are intended to benefit racial
172 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 515.
173 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18 (quoting Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975)
(quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849))).
174 See id. at 22 (noting that nothing suggests Congress intended the Act to be anything
other than a typical funding statute).
175 110 CONG. REC. 1540 (1964).
176 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
177 Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th
Cong. 2765-66 (1963) (testimony of Att'y. Gen. Robert Kennedy).
178 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000) (empowering federal agencies to effectuate the provisions
of section 601 ).
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minorities and may create enforceable rights under section 1983.
Agencies were given broad discretion under section 602, and valid
regulations promulgated pursuant to it that have the full force and
effect of law cannot be too far removed to confer actionable rights.
Therefore, plaintiffs bringing a section 1983 action to enforce the
EPA disparate impact regulations should meet the first part of the
Blessing test, which requires that Congress intended that the provision
benefit the plaintiff.
179
The Blessing test requires next that the asserted right not be so
vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial com-
petence. 180 Sections 7.30 and 7.35 of the EPA's implementing regula-
tions specifically prohibit actions that have an adverse and disparate
impact. There is already a substantial body of law that demonstrates
the capacity of the federal judiciary to analyze disparate impact
claims. 18  Federal courts have enforced rights created by Title VI
disparate impact regulations in contexts as diverse as public educa-
tion, housing, and transportation, and their ability to enforce specific
rights created by the EPA's implementing regulations was demon-
strated in New York City Environmental Justice Alliance v.
Giuliani.'82 In that case, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the City of New
York under section 602 from selling or bulldozing 1100 community
garden lots, an action they believed would have a discriminatory im-
pact on African-American, Asian-American, and Hispanic residents.
The court held that, although the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
harm, they failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits
because they did not submit adequate proof of causation to establish a
connection between the facially neutral city policy and its allegedly
disproportionate and adverse impact on minorities. Even though the
plaintiffs failed to establish their claim, the court had no difficulty in
determining whether or not they had an enforceable action. 183
Analysis of a disparate impact suit has several components.
First, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case
that a facially neutral practice has resulted in racial disparity. 84 In
response, the defendant must establish a substantial legitimate justifi-
cation or a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the practice. Once
the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must establish either
179 See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
"o See id. at 340-41.
'8' See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing education); Fergu-
son v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999) (discussing privacy); New York Urban
League v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing transportation).
'82 214 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2000).
183 Id. at 71 (holding that the plaintiffs chose a measure that was inadequate to allow the
court to ascribe significance to any alleged disparate impact of the city's actions).
184 See Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 480 (citing Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997
F.2d 1394, 1407 (1 1th Cir. 1993)).
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that the defendant overlooked an equally effective alternative with
less discriminatory effects or that the proffered justification is only a
pretext for racial discrimination. 185 As New York City Environmental
Justice Alliance demonstrates, courts are experienced at applying a
disparate impact analysis. Therefore, private enforcement of EPA
regulations under section 1983 will not strain judicial competency and
the second part of the Blessing test will be satisfied.
Third, under Blessing the provisions giving rise to the rights
must be couched in mandatory terms that impose binding obligations
on the states.' 86 Section 601 states that no person shall be subject to
discrimination by recipients of federal funding, while section 602 di-
rects a federal agency to promulgate regulations that will protect pri-
vate individuals from those who receive federal funds through that
agency.187 Section 7.35 of the EPA's implementing regulations states
that recipients shall not administer their programs in a way that has
the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination. 88  The right
created is mandatory for two reasons. First, these sections use the
word "shall," which indicates a mandatory obligation. Second, Title
VI falls under Congress' spending power, and the Supreme Court has
held that "legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much
in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree
to comply with federally imposed conditions.' 89 The states receive
funding from the federal government under the EPA; therefore, they
qualify as recipients under the regulations. They are bound as in a
contract to comply with these terms or risk losing federal financing.
The siting of environmental hazards requires permits by state gov-
ernmental bodies at the state, county, or local level. As recipients, the
states must ensure that they do not approve the siting of a facility that
would violate the EPA regulations. Because the regulations contain
the mandatory word "shall" and the states obligate themselves to fol-
low the regulations by receiving federal funds, regulations promul-
gated by the EPA under section 602 that require that recipients not
contribute to disparate impact discrimination in making decisions on
where to locate facilities impose binding obligations that satisfy the
third element of the Blessing test.
Even if all elements of the Blessing test are met, if Congress has
expressly or impliedly foreclosed a plaintiff's ability to enforce the
185 See New York Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036 (citing Georgia State Conference of
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11 th Cir. 1985)).
186 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341 (noting the third part of the test).
87 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000) (stating that agencies
with the power to extend federal funds to programs are directed to issue regulations consistent
with the objectives of the statute).
88 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2001).
189 Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
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regulations, then a section 1983 claim may not be brought. 9 ° This is
not a concern for environmental justice plaintiffs, however, because
Title VI contains no provision expressly foreclosing a plaintiffs abil-
ity to enforce regulations promulgated under it. Furthermore, a court
will find that Congress impliedly foreclosed such a remedy only if the
statute creates a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incom-
patible with individual enforcement. In only two cases has the Su-
preme Court held that Congress had implicitly foreclosed individual
action under section 1983.191
In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n,192 the Court focused on the unusually elaborate enforce-
ment provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act that
placed at the disposal of the EPA a large number of enforcement op-
tions, including noncompliance orders, civil suits, and criminal penal-
ties. Several provisions of the Act specifically authorized individuals
to initiate enforcement actions. Thus, the Court found it hard to be-
lieve that Congress intended to preserve section 1983 as a right of
action. 1
93
In Smith v. Robinson,194 the review scheme in the Education of
the Handicapped Act permitted aggrieved individuals to invoke care-
fully tailored local administrative procedures followed by federal ju-
dicial review. The Court reasoned that Congress could not possibly
have wanted a plaintiff to skip these procedures and go straight to
court under section 1983, since it would render the detailed proce-
dural protections superfluous. 195
Unlike the statutory schemes in Robinson, Title VI does not have
elaborate enforcement procedures, but instead includes a general pro-
vision for the termination of funding and defers to agencies to articu-
late standards for compliance.' 96 Section 602, as held in Sandoval,
also creates no private right of action to enforce the regulations as the
statute did in Sea Clammers. 197 Furthermore, the EPA regulations do
not exhibit an intent to foreclose individuals from pursuing remedies
190 See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341 (noting that dismissal is proper if Congress foreclosed a
remedy under § 1983).
'91 See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
192 453 U.S. 1.
193 See id. at 20 (noting that the FWPCA and MPRS do provide comprehension enforce-
ment mechanisms).
194 468 U.S. 992.
'95 Id. at 1011 (noting Congress' efforts to place primary responsibility to accommodate
the needs of each child with local and state educational agencies).
'96 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000) (stating that agencies with the power to extend federal
financial assistance to programs are directed to issue regulations consistent with the objectives
of the statute).
197 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001) (holding that there is no private
right of action under section 602).
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for violations under section 1983, but instead recognize and specifi-
cally address the possibility that individuals will seek judicial relief to
preserve their right to be free of discrimination caused by a disparate
impact.198 Therefore, a private right of action to enforce rights cre-
ated by the EPA's implementing regulations has not been explicitly or
implicitly foreclosed by either Congress or the EPA and a private ac-
tion may be brought under section 1983.
Because the Third Circuit held in South Camden that Congress
did not intend for section 602 violations to be enforceable under sec-
tion 1983, it did not reach the question of whether Congress had fore-
closed a remedy. However, the district court in that case held that
Congress did not foreclose a remedy, stating: "[T]he limited general-
ized enforcement power of the EPA to enforce Title VI and the im-
plementing regulations promulgated thereunder is insufficient to meet
the high threshold the Supreme Court has established for regulations
which may be deemed so comprehensive that they demonstrate a
congressional intent to foreclose recourse to Section 1983." 199
IV. ALTERNATIVES REMEDIES
If the Supreme Court were to hold either that the EPA regulations
prohibiting a disparate impact are invalid or that they do not create an
enforceable section 1983 right, then civil rights plaintiffs would have
to continue their pursuit for a viable legal remedy. This section will
briefly discuss the theory and potential of three of these alternatives:
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,2 00 lawsuits against the
EPA, and state-based remedies.
A. The Takings Clause
Part of the reason environmental hazards are situated in pre-
dominantly minority areas is that these social groups are less able to
bear the expense of campaigning against them. For the same reasons,
these groups cannot relocate after a siting decision has been made.
Thus, they are forced to live with the risks.20 1 A successful takings
claim would require that the government pay local residents for its
siting decision. This would give residents the choice whether to stay
'98 U.S. EPA, Draft Revised Guidelines for Investigating Title VI Administrative Com-
plaints Challenging Permits, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650, 39,673 (June 27, 2000).
199 South Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505, 546
(D.N.J. 2001).
200 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20' See Sandra L. Geiger, An Alternative Legal Tool for Pursuing Environmental Justice:
The Takings Clause, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 201, 202 (1998) (stating that poor and
minority communities have a greater likelihood of environmental exposure than the general
population).
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and would provide them with the financial resources to move.2 °2 Al-
ternatively, governments would be more willing to negotiate with
residents to buy them out and create "buffer zones" around the envi-
ronmental hazard, a technique that has proven successful in the
past.2 °3
William Treanor argues that the original understanding of the
Takings Clause protects property against physical seizures, but not
against regulations that affect value. 204 Because the sitings of envi-
ronmental hazards involve physical threats to tangible property, they
are closer in nature to physical seizures. Treanor also argues that
heightened protection should be afforded to the property interests of
those persons not historically protected from government decisions,
specifically, minorities and those others who have been singled out by
the nature of the decision. 5
The Supreme Court has extended protection under the Takings
Clause to both physical seizures and to regulations affecting value,
but it has extended the protection to regulations on a much more lim-
ited basis.20 6 Arguably, the siting of a local environmental hazard has
characteristics of both. Siting will not only lower the value of nearby
property, but it may also render affected property uninhabitable by
contaminating the air, soil, and water.20 7 If a piece of land is zoned
for solely residential purposes, then this might deprive the property of
its only economically viable use.20 8 Alternatively, a plaintiff may al-
lege that a siting constitutes a constructive physical taking of prop-
erty. This approach is safer because physical invasions of property
require compensation for even minor interference, and the public
benefit achieved by the project does not matter. At least one court
has held that a permanent, physical occupation is a government ac-
tion, so it is of such a unique character that it is a physical taking
without regard to other factors that a court may ordinarily examine. 9
There is support that continuous invasions of airspace superjacent to
property which directly and immediately interfere with the enjoyment
and use of the land constitute a taking within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment because it is equivalent to a direct invasion of the plain-
202 Id. at 222 (permitting residents to "vote with their feet" when a hazardous waste facility
is sited nearby).
203 Id. at 221 (describing efforts by Dow Chemical in Louisiana to minimize the effect of
its new chemical production plant).204 William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Politi-
cal Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 792 (1995).205 Id. at 875 (asserting that these groups are not well-positioned to secure redress at the
state or national level).
206 See Geiger, supra note 201, at 231.
207 See id. at 232.
208 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a
regulatory action may constitute a taking if it deprives the land of all economic worth).209 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
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tiff's land.2'0 Environmental justice plaintiffs may use such an argu-
ment to obtain compensation for pollution that comes onto their prop-
erty, and this would provide them with the resources to relocate.
This theory is not without its concerns and limitations; only one
environmental justice case has actually been decided on its merits. 21'
First, in environmental justice cases that have pursued a takings claim
in the past, ripeness has proven a major obstacle. Before succeeding
in federal court, a plaintiff must show that there has been a final, re-
viewable decision regarding the application of the government regula-
tion to the plaintiff's property and must first utilize state procedures
for obtaining compensation.2 2. The other step has been the major
stumbling point in previous cases; however, even the first part may
prove difficult because a court could hold that there has not been a
taking until the facility at issue is fully operational.2 3
Second, although invasions of the air, soil, and water may consti-
tute a constructive physical taking, inconsequential damage may not
be compensable under federal provisions.21 4 Thus, environmental
justice plaintiffs should consider bringing their takings claims in state
courts, which have demonstrated a greater willingness to compensate
individuals burdened by environmental hazards.21 5 Some state consti-
tutions provide a broader range of property protections than the
United States Constitution.216 The success of such an action depends
heavily on the particular state constitution and the strength of the
plaintiff's evidence of adverse effects. Therefore, although a takings
claim may succeed under the right circumstances, it will not provide a
complete remedy for the disparate impact of environmental hazard
siting decisions.
B. Suing EPA to Force It to Bring an Action
Another potential remedy that has been unsuccessful in the past,
but which may have to be reexamined, is judicial review of the EPA's
enforcement of Title VI. By suing the EPA, environmental justice
210 See Causby v. United States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that continuous invasions of
airspace interfered with use of land for chicken farm).
211 See Smith v. City of Brenham, 865 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1989).
212 See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186
(1985).
21.3 See East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Macon Bibb Planning and Zoning
Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264, 1266 (11 th Cir. 1990) (dismissing takings claim for lack of ripeness
because plaintiff had not sought compensation through state law procedures); see also Aiello v.
Browning-Ferris, Inc., 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 20771 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (dismissing case because of
failure to exhaust state court remedies). ,
214 See Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1962).
215 See Geiger, supra note 201, at 240.
216 See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. I, § 19 (providing that private property may only be taken
or damaged for public use when just compensation has first been paid to the owner).
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plaintiffs can force the EPA to either terminate funding to racially
discriminatory recipients or ensure that those recipients comply. 21 7
This alternative will only be available if the Supreme Court holds that
the EPA's effects regulations are a valid exercise of its power under
section 602. Courts have been reluctant to permit suits against an
enforcing agency, however, because the Supreme Court held in Can-
non v. University of Chicago218 that Title VI does not encompass ac-
tions against the funding agency. Since Cannon, courts have focused
on the relief sought by the plaintiff and have been more willing to
permit judicial review of individual siting decisions than those that
would require a remedy of continuous across-the-board federal court
supervision of agency action.21 9
Plaintiffs may also challenge an EPA decision under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA permits suits against a fed-
eral agency for failing to enforce its regulations only when no other
adequate remedy is available and when the decision is not committed
to agency discretion. 220 Decisions by the EPA to take no action are
also presumed to be immune from review. 221  However, a plaintiff
may challenge an agency's administration of its own Title VI en-
222forcement procedures. In Adams v. Richardson, the plaintiffs suc-
cessfully enjoined the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
to enforce its earlier determination that several recipient states were
operating racially discriminatory systems of higher education.223
Thus, if the EPA determines that a recipient is in violation of Title VI,
a plaintiff may challenge its refusal to take action. Because the EPA
may be reluctant to investigate potential violators and make determi-
nations of noncompliance, this alternative is also not a complete solu-
tion.224
C. State-Based Remedies
Besides seeking relief in federal court, an environmental justice
plaintiff may also be able to obtain relief in state court by advancing a
cause of action under state statutory or common law. Although statu-
217 See James H. Copley, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 168 (1994).
211 441 U.S. 677, 715 (1979)
219 See Copley, supra note 217, at 169.
220 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(2), 704 (1994).
221 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) ("[W]hen an agency refuses to act it
generally does not exercise its coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights, and
thus does not infringe upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect.").
222 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), aff'd 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
223 Id. at 1162-64.
224 See Copley, supra note 217, at 171 (stating that the EPA's reluctance to investigate
potential violators and make determinations of noncompliance is the primary loophole in this
approach, but that if the EPA does investigate, then its failure to enforce offers a strong indica-
tion that the EPA is abdicating its Title VI responsibilities).
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tory requirements differ from state to state, a developer usually must
apply to a state regulatory agency or siting board for a permit or li-
cense. 225  In many instances the procedural requirements are not
strictly followed and a plaintiff may challenge the decision. For ex-
ample, in El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of
Kings,226 an organization of Latino farm workers brought suit against
the state to enjoin the construction of a toxic waste incinerator. The
plaintiffs accused one of the defendants, Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, Inc., of making a pattern of singling out poor and minority
communities as incinerator sites.227 They obtained a partial victory
when the state court ruled that the environmental review documents
that had been prepared were inadequate under California's Environ-
mental Quality Act and that failing to provide a Spanish translation of
228its analysis violated the Act's public participation requirement.
Because state statutes are generally geared toward ensuring public
involvement and many require an agency or siting board to assess the
potential negative effect upon the host community, these procedural
requirements may continue to provide good opportunities for chal-
lenging siting decisions.
229
Finally, plaintiffs may challenge a citing decision as a nuisance
under state common law. To obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must
show that a tort has been committed, that no adequate remedy at law
is available, and that the balancing of social equities favors granting
an injunction. 230  An obstacle to a nuisance challenge is that such
claims have historically been directed at existing rather than proposed
land uses. Plaintiffs must show that the proposed use will cause im-
231
minent irreparable injury.
However, in Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 232 the
plaintiff village relied on an anticipatory nuisance theory and success-
fully enjoined the operation of a hazardous waste disposal facility.
The site in question was located above an abandoned coal mine
whose waste was stored in trenches surrounded by clay. The village
claimed that eventually the waste would migrate into groundwater
and that the toxic substances would mix together and create noxious
225 See Audrey Wright, Unequal Protection Under the Environmental Laws: Reviewing the
Evidence on Environmental Racism and the Inequities of Environmental Legislation, 39 WAYNE
L. REV. 1725, 1742 (1993).
226 No. 366045 (Sacramento Super. Ct. 1991).
227 Miles Corwin, Unusual Allies Fight Waste Incinerator, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, at
A3.
228 See Marcia Cole, Lawyers Try to Devise New Strategy, NAT'L L.J. Sept. 21, 1992, at
S.
229 See Wright, supra note 225, at 1744.
230 See id. at 1745.
231 Id.
232 396 N.E.2d 552 (I11. App. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 426 N.E.2d 824 (I1. 1981).
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odors or even ignite.233 Finding that the proposed waste dump was
both an existing and prospective nuisance, the trial court ordered the
removal of all toxic waste and contaminated soil buried there.234 In
addition, some courts have relaxed the causation element of nuisance
claims from a showing of imminent irreparable injury to one of prob-
able risk, which will make bringing an action against an anticipatory
nuisance easier.235 Therefore, if a section 1983 claim is not upheld,
environmental justice plaintiffs should continue pursuing alternative
remedies under both state statutory and common law.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to definitively say whether the Supreme Court
would hold that a private litigant may bring a section 1983 claim on
the basis of disparate impact discrimination against a recipient of fed-
eral funds under the EPA's implementing regulations promulgated
pursuant to section 602. Several inquiries have to be made. First, it
must be determined whether the EPA's regulations are a valid exer-
cise of the power delegated to it. As demonstrated, five justices in
Guardians indicated that such a regulation is valid even though sec-
tion 601 protects against intentional discrimination only. Second,
whether regulations created by an agency pursuant to a congressional
directive are "laws" under section 1983. Because the EPA's regula-
tions were directed by section 602 and have the force of law, that they
should qualify as enforceable laws under section 1983 must be
shown. Third, if the regulations are laws, the court must decide
whether they create enforceable rights and whether the rights they
create are mandatory and capable of being enforced by the judiciary.
The Supreme Court's discussion of congressional intent in Sandoval
is not controlling because it was examining whether Congress in-
tended a remedy, not an enforceable section 1983 right. The legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress intended to grant broad power to
agencies to prevent discrimination; therefore, regulations promulgated
pursuant to section 602 that have the force and effect of law are capa-
ble of creating enforceable rights. Finally, whether an action may
proceed because Congress did not intend to foreclose the possibility
of a section 1983 claim needs to be examined. The regulations do not
explicitly foreclose a section 1983 action nor create an enforcement
structure so comprehensive as to imply that a section 1983 remedy is
foreclosed. Therefore, even though the Supreme Court held that there
was no implied cause of action available under section 602, environ-
233 Id. at 558.
234 Id. at 553.
235 See A. Dan Tarlock, Siting of New Expanded Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facili-
ties: The Pigs in the Parlors of the 1980's, 17 NAT. RESOURCES L., 429, 447 (1984).
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mental justice plaintiffs may proceed in court under section 1983 to
enforce EPA regulations without first having to file a complaint with
the EPA itself first.
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